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United States v. Crowder1
On the afternoon of December 18, 1970, Crowder and an accomplice
entered the office of a doctor, intending to rob him.2 Crowder confronted
the doctor with a toy pistol; the doctor produced a gun of his own, and the
accomplice ran away. A struggle ensued; four shots were fired and Crowder
ran out of the office. He rejoined his accomplice, telling her that he had been
shot in the arm and leg, and that he thought he had killed the doctor. The
police later found the doctor's .32 caliber revolver across the street. The gun
had been fired four times.
The police later arrested the accomplice, who in turn implicated Crow-
der. After Crowder's arrest, the police noticed bandages over his right wrist
and left thigh. X-rays were taken of the wounds, disclosing what appeared to
be .32 caliber slugs.
On February 10, 1971, the United States Attorney filed an application
in federal district court for an order authorizing surgical removal of the
bullet from the defendant's right wrist. The application was supported by
affidavits relating the above evidence and the perceived medical risks of the
operation. 3 The defendant appeared with counsel and objected to entry of
the order. In a carefully drawn order, 4 Chief Judge Curran authorized
removal of the bullet from the subcutaneous tissue of Crowder's wrist.
5
Defendant petitioned for a writ of prohibition against execution of the
judge's order.6 This being denied, the defendant moved prior to trial to
have the bullet suppressed. This motion also was denied and the bullet,
along with the testimony of a ballistics expert that the bullet was fired from
the doctor's pistol, was admitted into evidence at trial. The defendant was
convicted of second degree murder, robbery, and carrying a dangerous
weapon.
1. 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
2. The evidence presented by the defendant differs substantially from that
introduced by the government. However, as the difference in facts is not determina-
tive of the surgery issue, the government's version is included herein.
3. Dr. Marcus Goumas, Senior Medical Officer at the jail where Crowder was
incarcerated, expressed the opinion that removal of the slug would be considered
minor surgery because: (1) the bullet was lying superficially under the skin of the
right forearm, and (2) removal would not involve any harm or risk of injury to
defendant's arm or hand or the use thereof.
4. The order directed that only the bullet in defendant's right arm was to be
removed, under accepted medical procedures, and that if during the operation
danger to defendant's life developed, removal procedures must cease. 543 F.2d at
314.
5. United States v. Crowder, No. 70-71 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 19, 1971).
6. Crowder v. Curran, No. 71-1105 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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On appeal, the conviction was affirmed five to four, the majority finding
the conclusion "irresistible" that removal of the bullet from defendant's wrist
was reasonable.7
The scant case law dealing with intrusive body searches,, is of recent
origin.' The first intrusive search case to be considered by the Supreme
Court was Rochin v. California.' On the basis of information that Rochin
was selling narcotics, three Los Angeles County deputies entered his house
and forced open Rochin's bedroom door. The deputies observed two cap-
sules on the nightstand beside the bed where Rochin was sitting and asked to
whom they belonged. Rochin put the capsules in his mouth. The three
deputies seized Rochin but were unable to retrieve the capsules from his
mouth. He was then taken to a hospital, where a doctor forcibly adminis-
tered an emetic solution. In the vomited matter were found two capsules
containing morphine, which were admitted into evidence over objection at
Rochin's trial. Justice Frankfurter, reversing the conviction on the basis of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, concluded that the
methods used to acquire the evidence were "conduct that shocks the consci-
ence" and "too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional
differentiation." 1" The standard established in Rochin was unclear, how-
ever, as the Court did not indicate whether it was the body intrusion alone or
the aggregate of police misconduct that was unlawful. 2
Five years later, in Breithaupt v. Abram "3 the Court distinguished the
"brutal" and "offensive" conduct inRochin from the taking of a blood sample
from an unconscious patient. Breithaupt was injured in an automobile
accident which resulted in the deaths of three persons. An empty whiskey
bottle was found in his glove compartment and the smell of liquor was
detected on his breath. He was taken to a hospital, still unconscious, and
7. 543 F.2d at 316.
8. The most frequently occurring examples of body evidence consist of external
physical characteristics consisting of voice and handwriting identification, finger-
prints, line-ups, taking a stance, etc. These areas include vastly different considera-
tions than the search and seizure issues involved in this note and as such will not be
dealt with herein.
9. Many of the cases dealing with intrusive body searches arose out of border
searches for drugs. Although conceptually similar, the legal considerations govern-
ing searches for narcotics concealed in an individual's body cavities differ procedur-
ally as well as substantively. See Note, From Bags to Body Cavities: The Law of the Border
Search, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 53 (1974); Note,BorderSearchesandtheFourthAmendment, 77
YAz L.J. 1007 (1968); Note, At the Border of Reasonableness: Searches by Customs Of-
ficials, 53 Comu.L. L. REv. 871 (1968).
10. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
11. Id. at 172.
12. For arguments supporting the latter position, see Note, Intrusive Body
Searches-Is Judicial Control Desirable? 115 U. PA. L. REv. 276, 280-81 (1966). As to
stomach searches generally, see Note, Constitutionality of Stomach Searches, 10 U.S.F.L.
REv. 93 (1975).
13. 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
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upon the request of a state patrolman, the attending physician took a sample
of Breithaupt's blood with a hypodermic needle. Testimony regarding the
results of the blood test was admitted into evidence at trial over objection. A
conviction for involuntary manslaughter resulted.
At the time of Breithaupt, the fourth amendment limitations on search
and seizure were not yet considered applicable to the states. The Court
therefore limited its inquiry to the consistency of the search with the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.1 4 Finding nothing "brutal" or
"offensive" in a blood sample taken by a physician from an unconscious
patient,1 5 the Court balanced the right of an individual to hold his person
inviolable against the interests of society in having the test performed.
Influenced by both the probative value and the deterrent effect of the test,
the Court found that Breithaupt's right to immunity from the invasion of his
person was "far outweighed" by the societal interests involved, and affirmed
Breithaupt's conviction.' 6
Several years after Breithaupt, the exclusionary rule was applied to
criminal trials in state courts.17 In addition, the fifth amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination was made applicable to the states by virtue of the
fourteenth amendment.' Thus, when the Court decided Schmerber v.
California 19 in 1966, the validity of the body intrusion was judged not merely
in light of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, but also
under the search and seizure requirements of the fourth amendment and
the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination.
The facts of Schmerber were similar toBreithaupt except that Schmerber
refused to take the blood test on the advice of counsel.2 0
The Court disposed of Schmerber's due process claim by citing Breithaupt.
More considered attention was given to the issues of self-incrimination and
search and seizure. The Court distinguished the blood test from a situation
in which a person is compelled "to submit to testing in which an effort will be
made to determine his guilt on the basis of physiological responses." 2 ' The
Court held that the application of the privilege against self-incrimination
14. Wolf v. Colorado 338 U.S. 25 (1949) was still controlling and denied
Breithaupt the benefit of having the search tested in terms of the fourth amendment.
Breithaupt's contention that the introduction of the evidence also violated his fifth
amendment rights was similarly disposed of by Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78
(1908).
15. 352 U.S. at 435.
16. Id. at 439-40.
17. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
18. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
19. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
20. Schmerber's claim that, by compelling him to take the test despite contrary
advice of counsel, the state had denied him his sixth amendment rights was summar-
ily rejected by the Court.
21. 384 U.S. at 764. Presumably this is the only situation in which the use of a
suspect's body as the source of "real or physical evidence" would violate the privilege.
1978]
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was otherwise confined to instances of compelled "communications" or
"testimony." 22 As such, the blood test was not inadmissible on privilege
grounds.
The paramount issue considered by the Court in Schmerber was the
reasonableness of body intrusions in light of the fourth amendment. The
Court began its discussion by noting that "[t]he overriding function of the
Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against
unwarranted intrusion by the State." 23 The Court said that in the context of
compelled intrusions into the body, the amendment's function was to con-
strain intrusions unjustified by the circumstances or made in an improper
manner.24 Scrutinizing the justifications for requiring the defendant to
submit to the blood test, the Court found that the attempt to secure evidence
was warranted. 25 Similarly, the type of test chosen and its administration
were found to be reasonable. The factors supporting the reasonableness of
the blood test were the probative value of test, its commonplace occurrence
in contemporary society, and the de minimus nature of the risk, trauma, and
pain involved. 26 The performance of the test was reasonable because the
blood was "taken by a physician in a hospital environment according to
acceptable medical practices." 27 Repeating that their judgment was con-
fined to the facts of the present case, the Court concluded with the now
proverbial caveat "[ihat the Constitution does not forbid the States minor
intrusions into an individual's body under stringently limited conditions in
no way indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions
under other conditions." 28
The Schmerber decision has been criticized for failing to articulate more
specifically the difference between permissible "minor" intrusions and im-
permissible "major" intrusions.29  However, in the context of fourth
amendment search and seizure, it has long been held that reasonableness is
properly decided only on the facts and circumstances of each case. 30 Thus,
22. Id. at 761.
23. Id. at 767.
24. Id. at 768.
25. The Court pointed out that the fourth amendment would forbid intrusions
on the mere chance that desired evidence would be obtained. However, in this
instance the Court found that there was probable cause to arrest Schmerber for
driving while intoxicated. The Court further concluded that given the evanescent
nature of alcohol in the bloodstream, the search was an appropriate incident of
Schmerber's arrest. Id. at 768-71.
26. Id. at 771.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 772.
29. See Comment, Search and Seizure: Compelled Surgical Intrusions? 27 BAYLOR L.
REv. 305, 309 (1975). See also Note, Constitutional Law-Search & Seizure-Georgia
Supreme CourtExpands Upon Extent of Permissible Body Intrusions, 24 MERCER L. REv. 687,
690 (1973).
30. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
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"major" and "minor" are tantamont to "unreasonable" and "reasonable" in
this instance. However, the absence of a carefully delineated standard has
allowed state courts to reach conflicting results on similar facts.31
Only one state appellate court has indicated that surgical intrusions may
beperse unreasonable. In Adams v. State 32 the Indiana Supreme Court flatly
stated that "an operation performed upon a defendant to secure evidence
comes within the constitutional prohibition of an unreasonable search." 33
The surgery performed upon the defendant in Adams was the removal of
bullet fragments located a short distance under the skin, in the soft tissues of
the buttocks and on the left side of the pelvis. The operation was performed
under a local anesthetic. The court nevertheless characterized the operation
as "an intrusion of the most serious magnitude" 34 and reversed the trial
court's determination that the evidence so obtained was admissible.
One state appellate court and one state trial court have found surgical
removal to be unreasonable in particular factual situations. 35 In Bowden v.
State 36 the Supreme Court of Arkansas quashed a search warrant authoriz-
ing surgical removal of a bullet located in defendant's lower spinal cord.
Expert medical testimony had established that removal could cause a worsen-
ing of defendant's condition and that a general anesthetic would be re-
quired. In addition, the opinion was expressed that the operation involved a
fatal risk, and that the surgery would be a "major" intrusion. Applying
Schmerber, the court found the requested intrusion to be both unreasonable
and offensive to due process because the risk of serious complication of
defendant's condition by non-consensual "major" surgical removal was
equal to or greater than the risk of non-removal. 37
31. State courts are at liberty to define "reasonableness" in a more restrictive
manner than the fourth amendment would require. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S.
58 (1967).
32. 260 Ind. 663, 299 N.E.2d 834 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974).
33. Id. at 669, 299 N.E.2d at 838. Curiously, although the court referred to
Schmerber, it cited and purported to be following Rochin.
34. Id. at 668, 299 N.E.2d at 837.
35. These two cases were decided only on the basis of the reasonableness of the
intrusion, without concurrent inquiry into the rapidly developing procedural pro-
tections being recognized by some courts. See notes 46-59 and accompanying text
infra.
36. 256 Ark. 820, 510 S.W.2d 879 (1974).
37. Id. at 824, 510 S.W.2d at 881. The due process implications of surgical
removal, although not the focal point of this note, are important enough to warrant
attention. Any time the state, acting as such, causes an operation to be performed
upon a suspect-defendant prior to trial and thus in advance of any adversejudgment,
it is risking injury or "punishment" of the suspect before any ultimate determination
of the suspect's guilt or innocence.
If the risk of removal is perceived to be smaller than or equal to the risk of
nonremoval, no due process problem should arise because removal could not logi-
cally be conceived of as punishment. This situation is somewhat analogous to compul-
sory vaccination, where it has long been held that under proper circumstances the
state may require an individual to submit to the risks of vaccination as a legitimate
exercise of its police power. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
1978]
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In People v. Smith 38 a New York trial court refused to grant an order
authorizing surgical removal of a bullet from deep within defendant's back.
Removal would have required a six-inch incision, general anesthesia, as-
sisted respiration, and hospitalization for seven or eight days after the
operation. The doctor who was to perform the surgery stated that although
removal would not substantially endanger life or limb, the operation was
major surgery.3 9 It was the surgeon's opinion that the bullet could remain
in defendant for the rest of his life without endangering his life or health.
The court found the proposed operation a "major" intrusion and thus
beyond the permissible boundaries of Schmerber."
Two state appellate courts have found surgical removal reasonable on the
facts of the respective cases. The Supreme Court of Georgia, in Creamer v.
State 41 found that the removal of a bullet from the subcutaneous area of the
right side of the chest by surgery lasting no more than fifteen minutes with a
local anesthetic would amount to a "minor" intrusion and thus be reasonable
under the Schmerber standard. Less than a year later, a Georgia court of
appeals unwillingly followed Creamer in Allison v. State.42 The uncon-
tradicted medical testimony in Allison showed that the bullet lodged under
defendant's skin could be surgically removed without danger to life or limb.
The surgery in Crowder consisted of an incision one-quarter inch deep
and one inch long in fat immediately under the skin. Crowder lost less than
five cubic centimeters of blood during the ten minute operation. The hospi-
tal's chief medical officer performed the surgery, and testified at the hearing
on a motion to suppress that he and his staff had taken every precaution to
protect defendant's health. 43
Although Crowder involves a factual situation in which almost every
substantive element appears to favor surgical removal, 44 the decision was
extremely close. Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
originally reversed Crowder's conviction.45 The opinion was withdrawn at
the request of the court, and after an en banc hearing, Crowder's conviction
It is only when the risk of removal substantially exceeds the risk of nonremoval
that pretrial surgery initiated by the state could be conceived of as punishment.
38. 80 Misc. 2d 210, 362 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
39. Possible complications were listed as minimal risk of death from general
anesthesia, respiratory complications, lung irritation, infection, hemorrhage, ab-
normal reaction from any of the anesthesia related drugs, and a very small risk
following general anesthesia of the development of pulmonary embolism. Id. at
211-12, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
40. Id. at 215, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
41. 229 Ga. 51.1, 192 S.E.2d 350 (1972), cert. dismissed, 410 U.S. 975 (1973).
42. 129 Ga. App. 364, 199 S.E.2d 587 (1973),cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1145 (1974).
43. 543 F.2d at 315.
44. See note 46 infra. This assumption rejects per se unreasonableness as an
alternative to any objective test.
45. United States v. Crowder, No. 73-1635 (D.C. Cir. May 27, 1975) (opinion
withdrawn at the request of the court on grant of an en banc hearing).
[Vol. 43
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was affirmed by a margin of five to four.4 6 The majority emphasized that:
(1) the evidence was relevant,47 could be obtained in no other way, and
probable cause existed to believe it would be found; (2) the operation was
"minor" and performed by a skilled surgeon taking all possible precautions
to reduce the risk of permanent injury; (3) defendant appeared with counsel
at an adversary hearing on the application for the order authorizing surgical
removal; and (4) before the operation was performed defendant was af-
forded an opportunity for appellate review of the order.48
It can be argued that the court in Crowder broke no new ground by
finding the surgery "minor" within the meaning of Schmerber because
Creamer and Allison had already characterized similar surgery as minor.
However, the same cannot besaid of the emphasis laid on the set of pro-
cedural protections which until Crowder had developed almost unnoticed in
fourth amendment surgical removal cases.
Crowder was afforded an adversary hearing at which he appeared with
counsel, and the order authorizing surgical removal was tested by means of a
writ of prohibition. 49 Probable cause to believe that the evidence existed in
Crowder's person was not challenged. The majority commended the pro-
secuting authorities for their effort to comply with the law, and viewed the
procedural methods utilized in the case as "skillful and imaginative legal
planning, bottomed upon cooperative utilization, rather than utter disre-
gard, ofjudicial power, and designed to achieve legitimate ends." 50 Judge
McGowan, while concurring in Judge Robb's opinion, did so only because of
"the Government's sensitivity to procedural orderliness and fair play," 51 and
cautioned that any future prosecutor faced with a similar situation would be
"well advised to look to the procedural example set in this case." 52
The emphasis placed upon an adversary hearing at the warrant stage
and interlocutory review is extraordinary from the standpoint of typical
fourth amendment search and seizure procedures. Extraordinary proce-
dures are necessary, however, when normal methods of rejecting im-
properly obtained evidence, i.e., the exclusionary rule, provide the
suspect-defendant with no positive protection against any unwanted and
possibly harmful operation. Determining the propriety of surgical re-
moval in a given fact situation is no routine task. However, the presence
46. United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062
(1977). The majority opinion by Judge Robb is essentially a verbatim reproduction of
his dissent in the opinion of May 27, 1975 which was withdrawn.
47. The evidence, while relevant, was not particularly probative, as it only tended
to prove that Crowder was present at the time of the shooting, a fact never disputed
by Crowder and proven by other evidence.
48. 543 F.2d at 316.
49. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
50. 543 F.2d at 316-17, quoting Adams v. United States, 399 F.2d 574, 579 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1067 (1969).
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of these procedures will cause a greater amount of relevant material to
be judicially scrutinized, thus minimizing the risk of error in a mixed
medical and legal judgment.
The most recent surgical removal case to be decided by a state supreme
court found the procedural example set forth in Crowder to be controlling. In
State v. Overstreet 53 the Supreme Court of Missouri concluded that Crowder
"dearly and correctly" 54 enunciated the appropriate standards and proce-
dures for use in authorizing and implementing the surgical pursuit of
evidence.
The reasonableness of the surgery involved in Overstreet was not the
focal point of the majority opinion. 55 Instead, the court's concern for the
procedural requirements recognized in Crowder caused an otherwise
reasonable "minor" intrusion 56 to violate the fourth amendment's guaran-
tee against unreasonable searches.
Two specific requirements of Crowder, an adversary hearing at the
warrant stage and an opportunity for interlocutory appellate review, were
lacking in Overstreet. In addition, the Missouri court in Overstreet found that
Crowder required the judge and not the surgeon to decide whether the
surgery was impermissible "major" surgery or permissible "minor"
surgery. 57 Procedures designed to resolve questions of reasonableness in
advance are not substitutes for constitutional guarantees. Indeed, it has been
suggested that by placing emphasis on the authorization procedure rather
than on the reasonableness of the intrusion itself, the importance of the
latter may become obscured. 58 This concern is misplaced. Authorization
procedures represent a minimum guarantee that the reasonableness of the
intrusion will be thoroughly considered. In those jurisdictions which do not
follow a "per se unreasonable" approach toward surgical removal, 59 an
53. 551 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. En Banc 1977).
54. Id. at 626.
55. The court did, however, specifically reject theAdams per se unreasonableness
approach to surgical removal. Id. at 625.
56. The court never specifically stated that had the Crowder requirements been
met the surgery would have been constitutionally permissible. Two incisions, three
and a half to four inches, were made into defendant's buttock after administration of
a local anesthetic. Defendant was discharged from the hospital the following day. Id.
at 624.
57. Id. at 628. In Overstreet the trial judge delegated authority to the surgeon to
make the decision whether to operate.
58. Note, Constitutional Law-Search & Seizure-Court Orders Surgical Removal of
a Bullet from an Unconsenting Defendant for Evidentiaiy Purposes Held Reasonable Under
the Fourth Amendment, 55 TEx. L. REv. 147, 153-54 (1976); State v. Overstreet, 551
S.W.2d at 632-33 (Donnelly, J., concurring).
59. The "per se unreasonable" position is not without support, and would cer-
tainly resolve the ambiguities inherent in the surgical removal issue. Per se unreason-
ableness, however, takes into account neither the long standing rule that reasonable-
ness in the context of its fourth amendment usage is properly decided only on the
[Vol. 43
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